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Abstrat
Reent development in quantum omputation and quantum infor-
mation theory allows to extend the sope of game theory for the quan-
tum world. The paper is devoted to the analysis of interferene of
quantum strategies in quantum market games.
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1 Introdution
Reent development in quantum omputation and quantum information the-
ory allows to extend the sope of game theory for the quantum world [1, 2℄.
1
In the "standard" quantum game theory one tries in some sense to quan-
tize an operational desription of the "lassial" game in question. Iqbal
and Toor have suessfully applied the method of quantization of games pro-
posed by Marinatto and Weber [3℄ in biology [4, 5, 6℄ and reently they have
used the same formalism to analyse the Stakelberg duopoly (leader-follower
model) [7℄. In the lassial setting of the duopoly game the follower beomes
worse-o ompared to the leader who beomes better-o. But they have
shown that in the quantum version the follower is not hurt even if he or she
knows the ation of the leader. The bakward indution outome is the same
as the Nash equilibrium in the lassial Cournot game (that is when dei-
sions are made simultaneously and there is no information hurting players).
Two of the present authors have managed to formulate a new approah to
quantum game theory that is suitable for desription of market transations
in terms of supply and demand urves [8℄-[11℄. In this approah quantum
strategies are vetors in some Hilbert spae and an be interpreted as super-
positions of trading deisions. For a trader they form the "quantum board".
The atual subjet of investigation may onsist of single traders, teams of
traders or even the whole market. Not the apparatus nor installation for
atual playing but strategies are at the very ore of the theory. Spontaneous
or institutionalized market transations are desribed in terms of projetive
operations ating on Hilbert spaes of traders' strategies. Quantum entan-
glement is neessary to strike the balane of trade. The disussed below
text-book examples of departures from the demand and supply law are re-
lated to the negative probabilities that often emerge in quantum theories and
form very interesting illustrations of them [9, 10℄. This model predits the
property of undividity of the traders' attention (no lonning theorem). The
theory unies also the English aution with the Vikrey's one attenuating
the motivation properties of the latter. There are analogies with quantum
thermodynamis that allow to interpret market equilibrium as a state with
vanishing nanial risk ow. Sometimes euphoria, pani or the herd instint
ause violent hanges of market pries. Suh phenomena an be desribed
by the non-ommutative quantum mehanis [8, 10℄. There is a simple tati
that maximize the trader's prot on an eetive market: aept prots equal
or greater then the one you have formerly ahieved on average. Here we
would like to analyse the onsequenes of interferene of quantum strategies.
We begin with the analysis of tatis hanging the demand. Then we dis-
uss the supply-side aspets. Both sides' strategies are related by the Fourier
transform.
2
2 Tatis hanging demand
Traders' strategies are represented by probability amplitudes (wave fun-
tions) |ψ〉. There are two important representations 〈q|ψ〉 (demand represen-
tation) and 〈p|ψ〉 (supply representation) where q and p are logarithms of
pries at whih the player is buying or selling, respetively [8, 11, 12℄. We
have dened anonially onjugate hermitian operators of demand Q and
supply P orresponding to the variables q and p haraterizing strategy of
the player. This led us to the denition of the observable that we all the
risk inlination operator [8℄:
H(P,Q) := (P − p0)
2
2m
+
mω2(Q− q0)2
2
, (2)
where p0 :=
〈ψ|P|ψ〉
〈ψ|ψ〉 , q0 :=
〈ψ|Q|ψ〉
〈ψ|ψ〉 , ω :=
2pi
θ
. θ is, roughly speaking, an average
time spread between two opposite moves of a player (e.g. buying and selling
the same ommodity) [12℄. The parameter m>0 measures the risk asymme-
try between buying and selling positions. Analogies with quantum harmoni
osillator are not aidental and one an even dene a parameter hE that
desribes the minimal inlination of the player to risk [8℄. The distribution
funtions, that is integrals of squared absolute values of the amplitudes, have
natural interpretation in terms of demand and supply urves [10, 11℄. This
piture should be supplemented with dynamis resulting from the traders'
tatial moves. Tatial moves of traders, that modify their behaviour on the
market, are desribed by unitary operations on the Hilbert spae of strategies
L2, 〈q|ψ〉∈L2. The fundamental tati that swithes the supply strategy into
the demand one and vie versa is desribed by the Fourier transform. There
are also tatis that only modify the demand or supply strategy without
swithing sides. We are interested in suh tatis that the resulting strategy
is a pure state and therefore annot be redued to a onvex ombination
of strategies that is to the omponents having denite supply or demand
harateristis. Suh ombinations are possible only if omponents are not
orthogonal (that is, they do not orrespond to lassial strategies). The pos-
sibility of forming suh ombinations is a pure quantum eet that annot
be desribed in terms of the lassial probabilisti approah.
The "linear shift" of the demand by ∆
D∆〈q|ψ〉 := 〈q −∆|ψ〉
3
ommutes with the supply operator P [8, 10℄ and therefore does not hange
the supply side. It only results in a phase shift of the Fourier transformed
strategy, 〈p|ψ〉 → eiℏ−1E ∆ p 〈p|ψ〉, so the shape of the supply urve of the player
is unhanged. The quantum formalism enables playing by using families of
tatis of the form (the proper normalization an be ahieved by respetive
normalization of supply and demand urves)
D∆(ξ0, ξ1) := ξ0I + ξ1D∆,
where (ξ0, ξ1) are homogeneous omplex projetive oordinates of points on
the Riemann sphere S2 ≃ CP 1 ≃ C, and I = D0 is the identity map. The
poles (1, 0) and (0, 1) orrespond to identity mapping of the initial strategy
and its shifted opies, respetively. The remaining points parameterize all
possible superpositions of the initial strategies. We dene the (ommuting)
omposition of tatis transforming the initial strategy 〈q|ψ〉 as:
D∆′(ξ′0, ξ′1) ◦ D∆′′(ξ′′0 , ξ′′1 ) := D∆′+∆′′(ξ′0 · ξ′′0 , ξ′1 · ξ′′1 ) .
The transition from a state being a normal (Gaussian) distribution to a
superposition of suh states is not unitary but the tatis D∆(ξ0 6= 0, ξ1 6= 0)
manipulating oeients of the superposition or the widths ∆ of Gaussian
omponents are unitary so it is onvenient to use instead of the tatis D(1, 0)
and D∆(1, 0) series of tatis whih are onvergent to them.
Let us investigate the eet of the family of tatis D∆(ξ0, ξ1)ξ0,ξ1 on the
proess of hanging the demand (and the orresponding supply) with the
eets of the interferene of the strategies. They represent behaviours of the
player whih dier from the standard one ditated by the law of demand and
supply. The diverse market strategies might be identied with the behaviours
of the player onneted with the prie of the partiular goods (whih have
appeared under dierent states of his (or her) knowledge or perhaps sub-
onsiousness). Then the superposition of the strategies of the player ould
be interpreted as the appearane of the diverse types of ouplings between
simultaneous ensembles of dierent states of the player. Often during the
alteration of our opinions and harateristi behaviours, the old and new
stages of our hanging individuality oexist with eah other in a variety of
relations. With the lak of suh oexistene, "shizophreni" states might
lead to the behaviors whih are soially ineient.
4
3 The results of the tati D∆(ξ0, ξ1) for the
Gaussian strategy
We are interested in quantum desription of a game whih onsists in buying
or selling of market goods. We will investigate the pure adiabati strategies
only. Suh a restrition is justied by the fat that in the market reality the
inlination to the risk seems to be a harateristi feature of the player hene
for one partiipant of the market it is unhanged even over big intervals of the
time. Therefore the player has at his (her) disposal the Gaussian standard
strategy, whih is equal to the square root of the standard normal distribution
〈q|ψ〉g := 14√2pi e−
q2
4
as a funtion of the logarithm of the prie, above whih
the player give up buying goods oered to him (withdrawal prie [10, 12℄).
The free hoie both of the urreny unit and the logarithmi base allows
to hoose the two rst moments of the distribution |〈q|ψ〉g|2 to be equal to
q0=0 and σ=1 respetively. It is worth to notie that the Gaussian strategy
is, in the quantum setting, the only one whih fullls the law of the demand
and supply.
Let the player operates with tatis whih belonging to the family {D∆(z) :=
D∆(ξ0, ξ1)}. To abbreviate the notation we use the inhomogeneous oordi-
nate on the Riemann sphere,
ξ1
ξ0
=: z ∈ C. As the result of applying the
tatis D∆(z), the Gaussian strategy is replaed with the superposition of
the Gaussian strategies, given by
e−
q2
4 −→ e− q
2
4 + z e−
(q−∆)2
4 .
In the following Figures we will ompare the player's demand given by
the funtion of the probability density distribution |D∆(z)〈q|ψ〉g|2 with the
density funtion given by
1
1√
2pi
( 1
1 + |z|2 e
− q2
2 +
|z|2
1 + |z|2 e
− (q−∆)2
2
)
, (1)
whih would appear in the lassial theory (in whih the interferene eets
are negleted). As a result of interferene, for arg(z) = 0, we observe the
biggest overlapping of two Gaussian urves, whih in addition are submitted
1
In the quantum theory suh a type of density funtions appear in the ase of the
tatis D∆(z), for whih z is imaginary (arg(z) = ±pi2 ).
5
to a mutual attration. Figure 1 illustrates the ase for ∆=3 and z=0.9. In
order to demonstrate the sale of the quantum eets, the orresponding sum
of two Gaussian strategies whih does not have the interferene ingredient
(1) is drawn in Figure 1 and the following ones as the dashed line.
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Figure 1: Construtive interferene of two Gaussian strategies whih are
the eet of the tati D3(0.9). The dashed line orresponds to the tati
D3(±0.9i).
In ontrast is the ase with arg(z)=pi. It is represented in Figure 2. Now,
after the hange of the phase of the z parameter only, the bell like urves
whih have their origin in the superposition of the Gaussian urves are fully
separated. The interferene is also the ause of their mutual repulsion. The
smaller the gap between the Gaussian omponents the stronger the inuene
of the interferene is. Figure 3 represents the ase with the Gaussian urves
of similar height (z =−√0.9) whih are overlapping in pratie (∆= 0.2).
Yet, the destrutive interferene enhanes these features that disriminate
between the urves.
The integral urves of the distribution of the probability densities given
in Figure 3 (hene the umulative probability, but with the inverted domain)
are represented in Figure 4. In agreement with the previously given market
interpretation of the quantum theory [9℄-[11℄ they desribe the inuene of the
quantum (interferene) eets onto the shape of the demand urve alulated
for the tati D0.2(−
√
0.9).
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Figure 2: Destrutive interferene of two Gaussian strategies for the tati
D3(−0.9). The dashed line orresponds to the tati D3(±0.9i).
4 Fourier transform of the tatis D∆(z)
We have analyzed the demand following from the strategy whih in the de-
mand representation is a superposition of the Gaussian strategies. The de-
sription of the strategies in terms of squared modules of the probability
amplitudes (as it is in the lassial piture) and not the amplitudes them-
selves is inomplete. Hene it is interesting to omplete it by the desription
of the very strategy in the relation to its supply aspet. The quantum de-
sription of the market presented in this paper requires to pereive a player as
a subjet of a market, who aording to the demand representation 〈q|ψ〉 of
his strategy |ψ〉 aquires a spei ommodity and onsuming it (proessing
or leaving unhanged) gains a prot desribed by the operator Q+ P. It is
this observable, and not Q alone, whih does not depend on the hoie of the
monetary unit and measures the prie of the ommodity in the transation.
The density of the probability of the supply random variable p determines the
square of the module of the supply representation 〈p|ψ〉 of the same strategy
|ψ〉 aording to whih the goods has been purhased!
The strategy |ψ〉, represented by the funtion 〈q|ψ〉 or its transform 〈p|ψ〉,
expresses therefore the full relation of the player with the market. The in-
dependent treatment of supply and demand aspets of behaviours appearing
7
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Figure 3: The destrutive interferene "pushing aside" two of the overlapping
Gaussian strategies having similar height  the tati D0.2(−
√
0.9). The
dashed line orresponds to the tati D0.2(±
√
0.9i).
on the market is not in agreement with the quantum desription. As far as
the interferene phenomenon is disussed, the tatis D∆(z) do not ommute
with the Fourier transformation hene it is not indierent in whih represen-
tation, the supply or demand one, the player performs the superposition of
the strategies. The supply probability density for the strategies whih are
the demand superposition of the Gaussian strategies for four dierent values
of their relative phase, that is of the angle arg(z), are illustrated in Figures 5
and 6.
In the ase of a player ating as a ommerial agent, the derivative of the
umulative probability ould be interpreted as the intensity of the sale signal
whih is sent by the player to the market when he is going to sell a goods
purhased beforehand
2
.
We notie that manipulating with the phase allows for a wide hoie of
the trader's behaviour whih haraterizes the supply aspet of the tatis
D∆(z).
The tatis with arg(z)=0 has the learly loalized sale signal (Figure 5),
in the opposition to two equivalent maxima of the sale tati with arg(z)=pi.
2
Market games dier a little depending on whether the player announes the will of
buying or aepts the prie of goods.
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Figure 4: The hange of the demand urve aused by the quantum interfer-
ene eet presented in Figure 3.
For arg(z) = 3
2
pi (Figure 5) we have that with the falling of the prie3, the
buy signal appears at rst autiously, but after a farther deline, it reappears
for the seond time as a stronger one.
The opposite situation ours for arg(z) = 1
2
pi (Figure 6). Let us notie
that just only the measurement of the random variable p allows to distinguish
between the strategy D3(i) and D3(−i).
5 The onditional demand
An interesting thing is the examination of variety of aspets of the strate-
gies whih is using the presentation of them in the domain of the phase
spae {p, q} with the help of the Wigner funtion. For the pure state |ψ〉
this pseudo-probability density funtion an be alulated with the following
formula
3
The variable p has been hosen so that it diminishes with the inrease of the unit prie
of goods.
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Figure 5: The probability density for the Fourier transforms of the tatis
D3(1) (the ontinuous line) and D3(−i) (the dashed line).
W (p, q) := h−1E
∫ ∞
−∞
eiℏ
−1
E
px
〈q + x
2
|ψ〉〈ψ|q − x
2
〉
〈ψ|ψ〉 dx (2)
= h−2E
∫ ∞
−∞
eiℏ
−1
E
qx
〈p+ x
2
|ψ〉〈ψ|p− x
2
〉
〈ψ|ψ〉 dx, (3)
where
hE
2pi
is the dimensionless eonomis ounterpart of the Plank onstant.
Figure 7 presents the behaviour of the player who is operating with the
market tati D0.2(−
√
0.9).
Note that the asymmetri rater-like hollow in the diagram has the mini-
mum bellow zero, the fat whih qualitatively distinguishes the Wigner fun-
tion from the supply and demand distributions for models formulated in the
realm of the lassial probability theory in whih the measure of the proba-
bility has to be nonnegative. The intersetion of the surfae of the diagram
with the surfae given by p = onstant depits the onditional probability
density whih is the measure of the probability for the withdrawal prie of
the player in the situations when this prie is onstant during the at of
selling. The ross setions for the negative values of the Wigner funtion are
harateristi for the situation of the gien-strategy. The suitable integrals
for these urves represent fully rational situations for whih the demand (or
10
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Figure 6: The probability density for the Fourier transforms of the tatis
D3(−1) (the ontinuous line) i D3(i) (the dashed line).
supply) ease to be a monotonous funtion. The example of suh a reation
of the player (it might be the rest of the world) is illustrated in Figure 8.
We observe here the lak of the property of the monotoniity for the de-
mand (or supply) urves (Gien paradox). In this ontext it is worthy to
raise the question whether the legendary aptain Gien, after observing a
market anomaly whih is ontraditory to the law of demand, has reorded
the surprising (although having an explanation) demand that dereases af-
ter the fall of the prie, or simply notied the destrutive interferene whih
had been the eet of a areful demand transformation harateristi for a
intelligent (hene ating rationally) but poor onsumer. The authors inline
towards the seond answer. It has the superiority beause of its ability to
be falsied [13℄ whih is a onsequene of the preision qualitative predi-
tions for this phenomenon made by the quantum theory. The ase of the
non-monotonous onditional demand for interfering Gaussian strategies has
been haraterized before. We reall that this harateristi is the proper one
for all non-Gaussian strategies. Therefore it seems important to look after
the onditions of the market game under whih the strategies desribed by
the normal distributions do not lead to the maximalization of value of the
intensity of the gain. They might explain the irumstanes in whih we met
the gien-strategies.
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Figure 7: Plot of the Wigner funtion for the tati D0.2(−
√
0.9).
The areful reader has ertainly notied other, besides the non-monotoniity,
harateristi of the integral urves for some ross setions of the diagrams
of the Wigner funtion. They have global maxima for denite values of the
parameter q = qmax (eg, for the surfae in Figure 7 with the opposite ori-
entation of the axis p). It means that there exists a nonzero prie of the
ommodity e
qmax−q0
σ
under whih the player irreversibly losses his interest in
its buying. For example in the apriious world of the fashion business suh a
kind of market behaviours are frequently notied; they are also known by the
owners of the rubbish aution. The example of a onditional demand urve
is presented in Figure 9. When, under the ondition of unhanging tati
player's estimation of the usefulness of the goods has diminished properly,
and afterwards the value of the parameter p has been hanged, then the new
ross setion shall be free from this anomaly.
Both of the just disussed phenomena of the departures from the law of
demand and supply (and also others paradoxial properties) disappear if only
the ross setions are integrated over p. The thus obtained joint umulative
probability of demand, being the integral of the square of the module of the
12
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Figure 8: The non-monotonous onditional demand for the tati
D0.2(−
√
0.9) (The integral urve for the intersetion of the surfae from Fig-
ure 7 with the plain p = 0.4[ℏE
σ
]).
funtion 〈q|ψ〉, fullls the orthodox form of the law.
The above onsiderations have proved that the superposition of the ele-
mentary quantum strategies has peuliarities whih are well known from the
observations of markets. The modeling of these behaviours in the realm of
the traditional probability theory would be impossible for the same reason
that made the physiists to rejet the lassial piture of the world. In this
ontext it seems obvious that eg the designers of the software, whih auto-
matially invests on apital markets, sooner or later will be onfronted with
the need of using models of quantum market games. Hene it is worthy to
make a few omments on the unique eay whih is harateristi for the
quantum tatis.
6 Self-onsistent nonlinear tatis
In Ref. [12℄ the nonlinear tatis DE(q) operating on the Dira strategy whih
ould be pereived as a limit of Gaussian strategies for σ → 0 were ana-
lyzed. Due to the unique property whih is onneted with the xed point
theorem [12℄ it appears to be the method of the maximization of the gain
13
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Figure 9: The non-monotonous onditional demand with the maximum for
the nonzero value of the prie. The tatiD0.2(−0.9− 12 ) (the integral urve for
the ross setion of the surfae from Figure 7 with the plane p = −0.2[ℏE
σ
]).
in the market game, in whih the rest of the world, being in a polarization
ompelling to the exhibition of the oers of pries, aepts the passive tati
I on its own Gaussian tati. The tati DE(q) requires the measurement
of the mean E(q) hene it an not be used in a single game. Yet, in the
sequene of idential games, when a partner behaves in a passive manner,
we are able, in view of the past experienes, to approximate the parameter
E(q) so that in the following one to shift our withdrawal prie to this value.
The tati DE(q) understood in this way is then the unitary one, and being
the quantum operation guarantees to us the onditions required for being
ondential. The just mentioned xed point theorem assumes that measure
of the probability given by the opponent's tati is positive denite. It is
possible that if an obligatory passive opponent (e.g. the rest of the world is
not able to reat to the inonvenient behaviour of only one small partiipant
of the market) hooses the gien-strategy then the tati DE(q) losses the
quality of the most beneial one. The infany of quantum omputers do
not hinder us from simulating the senarios of quantum games on the tradi-
tional omputers. In suh situations the use of the simplest quantum tatis
whih are similar to the ones presented here should bring the ompletely new
qualitative eets. These tatis are more rih than the hardly similar to the
14
alive human market behaviour present algorithms for automati investment.
Even today the quantum strategies might be used on apital markets if only
funds are raised to be managed in the quantum manner. Also nothing is
opposing to the possibility that new markets appear, on whih all parties of
transations might be using quantum tatis. The physial quantum mod-
els oer the solutions whih are extremely stable in omparison with their
lassial ounterparts [14℄. So, perhaps the quantum markets would protet
the future soiety from negative onsequenes of the deep osillations of the
pries whih are harateristi for nowadays eonomy.
For the needs of the time, when the priniples of the funtioning of the
market allow to analyze behaviors of partners of transations, the game,
whih is played with an opponent whose tati is reating to our hanges
of the strategy, should be examined. Suh games posses the thermodynami
analogies and allows to desribe proesses of reahing the market equilibrium.
Beause of the extension of the subjet, the analysis of the ompetitive mar-
ket tatis exeeds the limits of this paper whih skethes only the theme of
the quantum market games.
7 Conlusions
When the player has at his disposal two pure strategies |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 then
the set of the lassial strategies in whih (going from |ψ0〉 to |ψ1〉) he an
make hanges in a ontinuous way, is limited to the one dimensional set of
the mixed strategies spanned over the points |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉. In omparison
to this, the quantum theory oers him extremely reah possibilities. He or
she faes a hoie of a one from many optional ontinuous urves for many of
the paths onneting the poles of the sphere S2. Therefore suh a "quantum
player" puts the qualitatively new hallenges to an opponent. The opponent
who has at his disposal the knowledge based on the lassial game theory
only, often is doomed from the start.
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